

Secure and private connectivity in smart environments


Acronym: SURPRISE

SSF Cyber Security Program *Project ID*: RIT17-0005

PI: Papadimitratos (KTH)

Co-PIs: Fischer-Hübner (KAU), Johansson (LTH), Larsson (LiU), Skoglund (KTH) <u>https://nss.proj.kth.se/surprise/</u>

Overview & Goals



- Three key security and privacy (S&P) enablers
 - Trust management, including identity and credential management for S&P
 - Lean, resilient S&P preserving communication and networking
 - Data validation and S&P preserving processing

Research Environment Consortium



Research Environment

Consortium (cont'd)

WP1: Trust management WP3: Lean S&P networking



WP7: Integration & Demo



KTH VETENSKAP OCH KONST

NSS

WP6: Data Analytics

WP5: Efficient distributed storage & processing

WP2: Resistance to jamming WP4: Data-centric validation



ISE



Research Environment Academic collaborations

Beyond the proposal: RISE, Digital Futures, SecurityLink & FOI



Research Environment Academic collaborations (cont'd) **Beyond the proposal:** ESA, KI; several bilateral collaborations; top conference organization


South Africa

Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium On the Internet, 2021



Research Environment Industrial collaborations **Beyond the proposal:** ICA, mozilla, einride, Google, City of Gothenburg





- Support Certificate Transparency in Tor
- Privacy-Preserving
- Incrementally-deployable

Scientific Results WP2: Selected paper

Cooperative Location Privacy in Vehicular Networks: Why Simple Mix Zones Are Not Enough

Mohammad Khodaei⁽⁾, *Member, IEEE*, and Panos Papadimitratos⁽⁾, *Fellow, IEEE*





Fig. 2. Mix-zone construction with decoy traffic.

Fig. 8. Comparison among CMIX (B1) [37], chaff-based CMIX (B2) [42], and our scheme: 1K chaff pseudonyms in a CF with $\rho = 10^{-25}$; beacon frequency: $\gamma_{mz} = 0.5$, $\gamma_{\nu} = 0.2$. (a) Computation and communication overheads. (b) Communication overhead, averaged every 300 s.



Scientific Results WP3: Selected paper

Algorithm 1. KEM.CCA.Encaps

Input: pk Output: c and s

1: pick a random \mathbf{m}

2: $(\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{k}) \leftarrow H_1(\mathbf{m}, \mathsf{pk})$

3: $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathsf{PKE}.\mathsf{CPA}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk},\mathbf{m};\mathbf{r})$

4: $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow H_2(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{k})$

5: Return (\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{s})

Skriv text här

Algorithm 2. KEM.CCA.Decaps

Input: sk, pk, c

 $\mathbf{Output:} \ \mathbf{s}'$

1: $\mathbf{m}' \leftarrow \mathsf{PKE.CPA.Dec}(\mathsf{sk}, \mathbf{c})$ 2: $(\mathbf{r}', \mathbf{k}') \leftarrow H_1(\mathbf{m}', \mathsf{pk})$

2. $(\mathbf{I}, \mathbf{K}) \leftarrow \mathbf{\Pi}(\mathbf{\Pi}, \mathbf{p}\mathbf{K})$

3: $\mathbf{c'} \leftarrow \mathsf{PKE}.\mathsf{CPA}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk},\mathbf{m'};\mathbf{r'})$

4: if $(\mathbf{c}' = \mathbf{c})$ then Return $\mathbf{s}' \leftarrow H_2(\mathbf{c}, \mathbf{k}')$


5: else Return $\mathbf{s}' \leftarrow H_2(\mathbf{c}, \mathsf{sk}_r)$, where sk_r is a random seed in sk 6: end if

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2020 D. Micciancio and T. Ristenpart (Eds.): CRYPTO 2020, LNCS 12171, pp. 359–386, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56880-1 13 A Key-Recovery Timing Attack on Post-quantum Primitives Using the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation and Its Application on FrodoKEM

Qian Guo^{1,2(\boxtimes)}, Thomas Johansson¹(\boxtimes), and Alexander Nilsson^{1,3}(\boxtimes)

¹ Department of Electrical and Information Technology, Lund University, Lund, Sweden {qian.guo,thomas.johansson,alexander.nilsson}@eit.lth.se Selmer Center, Department of Informatics, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway ³ Advenica AB, Malmö, Sweden

- NIST PQ project candidate
- We show how to recover the secret key by feeding the Decaps with special c and then study timing information



Scientific Results WP4: Selected paper

Protecting GNSS Open Service-Navigation Message Authentication against Distance-Decreasing Attacks

Kewei Zhang, Erik G. Larsson Fellow, IEEE and Panos Papadimitratos Fellow, IEEE HTX 1 bit ED 0.9 1 bit ARX 0.8 ATX 1 bit 0.7 TLC HTX **5**0.6 T_{DD} of the TLC/T int =0.2500 0.5T_{IC}/T=0.3720 Power 0.4 HRX 1 bit T_{LC}/T in =0.4940 *--- T_{LC}/T _{int} =0.6160 0.3 _T_{1C}/T int =0.7136 time 0.2 0.1 (a) Illustration of DD attack. 5 15 20 25 0 10 30 SNR (dB) HRX

(a) Detection probability with the Shapiro-Wilk test.


(b) Adversary illustration for DD attack on GNSS.

Fig. 1: Distance-decreasing attacks on GNSS signals.

Scientific Results WP5: Selected paper

The Capacity of Private Information Retrieval With Eavesdroppers

Qiwen Wang^(D), Member, IEEE, Hua Sun^(D), Member, IEEE, and Mikael Skoglund^(D), Fellow, IEEE



A set of messages stored on multiple servers

User should be able to download any message without revealing which data is of interest


Naïve approach: download everything

Capacity C = maximum number of requested message bits per downloaded bit

Scientific Results WP6: Selected paper A Design Framework for Strongly χ^2 -Private Data Disclosure

Amirreza Zamani[®], Member, IEEE, Tobias J. Oechtering[®], Senior Member, IEEE,

and Mikael Skoglund¹⁰, Fellow, IEEE



Efficient design framework for privacy mechanisms

Nonlinear non-convex problem approximated by linear program

New designs and geometrical insight

Events



Cybersecurity and Privacy (CySeP) Summer School

Navigation Registration Venue

June 8-12, 2020, Stockholm, Sweden

Due to the COVID-19 situation, after extensive discussions with all involved: the joint CySeP and SSF CyberSecurity Program mid-term conference will *not* take place June 8-12, 2020. Similarly, the final phase of the 3rd Midnight Sun CTF will *not* take place June 13-14, 2020. The future dates and arrangements will be announced ASAP. Thank you!

Tweets from @cysep1

Follow on Twitter



We are hiring @NetSysSecKTH; pre- and post-doctoral and an advertised of the second s



CySeP dates: TBA

Poster/demo/short talk deadline: TBA

Registration deadline: TBA (early) Open till: TBA









Deltagande universitet och högskolor Aktiviteter ~ **Om SWITS** Epost-lista

Kontakt 🗮 English

SEMINARIER

2022, June 2-3 22nd SWITS Seminar in Karlstad

2021. June 3 21st SWITS Seminar (Online)

2020. June 2 20th SWITS Seminar (Online)

2019. June 3-4 19th SWITS Seminar in Karlstad

2018. June 18th SWITS Seminar in Stockholm at KTH in cooperation with CySeP

2017. June 8-9 17th SWITS Seminar in Oslo (in cooperation with with COINS)

2016. June 9-10 16th SWITS Seminar in Linköping

2015. June 11-12 15th SWITS Seminar in Sätra Brunn

2014. June 12-13 14th SWITS Seminar in Uppsala



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